The Rutgers Philosophy Department and the Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science will be hosting a cool workshop September 18-20, bringing together scholars from the NYC area, Amsterdam (the Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation), and Munich (the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy). The schedule is HERE. I proudly feature as a MCMPer 
Title and abstract of my talk below.
Judgments of conditional probability vs. evidential support:
An experimental comparison in accuracy and time-consistency
Abstract: Inductive reasoning requires exploiting links between evidence and hypotheses. This can be done focusing either on the posterior probability of the hypothesis when updated on the new evidence or on the impact of the new evidence on the credibility of the hypothesis. But are these two cognitive representations equally reliable? We investigate this question by comparing probability and impact judgments on the same experimental materials. The results indicate that impact judgments are more consistent in time and more accurate than probability judgments. Impact judgments also predict the direction of errors in probability judgments. These findings suggest that human inductive reasoning relies more on estimating evidential impact than on posterior probability. [Joint work with Katya Tentori and Nick Chater.]